The European Commission’s Impact Assessment of Solvency II: Some Useful Points

The European Commission recently published a draft of the Solvency II ‘implementing measures’.  The ‘implementing measures’ expand on the requirements set out in the Solvency II directive.  Alongside the ‘implementing measures’, the European Commission also published a draft impact assessment.  This is one the many procedural requirements that apply to the policy-making process in the Commission. 

I thought it would be interesting to review the impact assessment.  As a user, I want to consider the extent to which the impact assessment can help me to understand Solvency II. 

What did I learn from this exercise?

1.    The importance of objectives in the EU policy-making process

The impact analysis is structured around a definition of problems that the policy making will address.  During the discussions about the directive, these objectives were enhancing policyholders’ protection and the integration of insurance markets in the EU. 

The Commission’s impact analysis acknowledges that there is now a third objective that has been taken into account: fostering growth and recovery in Europe by promoting long-term investment.  In the case of insurance, the main challenges that arise relate to the low interest rate environment and the volatility of asset prices. 

2.    A useful summary of how the calibration of asset risk has evolved

The third objective mentioned above has shaped the structure and calibration of capital requirements for assets risk which has evolved over a number of years.  However, it is not easy to see in a succinct way the end product where the answer is set out over a number of articles in the implementing measures.  Surprisingly, this can be summarised in a simple table (below).

3.    The scope of impact analysis remains a tricky issue

The Commission seems to have overcome the challenge of undertaking an impact analysis that seeks to cover the impact of all rules.  The Commission states,

“The options assessed have been selected to cover the most important and representative issues from each of the three pillars of Solvency II and each of the areas of the objectives and problem trees. The areas that are merely technical, have been settled in the Directive or are uncontroversial are not assessed in detail …”

This is reasonable and can result in a more productive use of scarce analytical resources but it can also have unintended consequences.  As far as I can see, the impact analysis did not cover the treatment of long-term guarantees.  I am frankly not sure if this is because it was settled in the Directive or because it turned out to be uncontroversial.

4.    The relative priorities of the Commission: the importance of reducing over-reliance on ratings

The concern about over-reliance on ratings is not new if you have been following the development of Solvency II.  However, given the breadth of Solvency II and the focused impact assessment, I found it surprising that the Commission went out of its way to include a full two-page annex summarising the requirements aimed at reducing reliance on external ratings in the risk management of insurance “such as

          ▪ external ratings shall not prevail in risk management;

          ▪ as part of their investment risk management policy, insurers and 
          reinsurers should have their own assessment of all counterparties;

          ▪ as part of their reinsurance (or other risk mitigation techniques) policy, 
          insurers and reinsurers should have their own assessment of all 
          counterparties.”

5.    And finally, a puzzle about policy making

The Commission’s impact assessment notes that one of the issues that emerged from the QIS5 was the application of a limit to the amount of Tier 2 capital (i.e. debt) that would be allowed.  This issue has remained unclear since then. 

Interestingly, if all you read is the relevant section of the impact analysis on pages 38 to 46 which also summarises EIOPA’s recommendations, you could be forgiven for thinking that the limit would not apply.  It is only the summary on pages 50 to 51 that suggested that I might need to reconsider my initial views.  Indeed, the draft implementing measures clarify that the sum of Tier 2 and Tier 3 capital must not exceed 50% of the SCR, which is an interesting development. 

This illustrates one of the key operational challenges of impact analysis: the need to keep up with the policy.

This was a selective but nonetheless in-depth reading of the impact assessment.  Have you read the impact assessment?  Did you learn any useful points from it?

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The Cost and Benefits of EU Membership

A lot that has been said about the recent elections to the European Parliament.  (Full disclosure: I am an EU national living in the UK.)  For me, part of the debate in the UK represents a useful reminder of the challenge of cost-benefit analysis.  Not surprisingly, there isn’t an accepted view about the balance between costs and benefits of EU membership.  Here is an illustration of the range of estimates (as of 2013) from a research paper of the UK Parliament:

I reviewed some of what has been written and have also read with interest Hugo Dixon's recent book - 'The in / out question'.  I thought that rather than develop another cost-benefit analysis, I would set out the main considerations to take into account if you choose to read one of them to form your own views.

It seems uncontroversial – I think – that the economic benefit from EU membership is the access to supply products and services to a market of 510 million consumers and an economy the size of the US.  Hugh Dixon quotes an estimated benefit of the order of 4% to 5% of UK GDP.  If you accept this, then the key questions are whether: 

•  the costs to the UK of achieving that benefit offset it; and  
•  the benefit can be achieved through an alternative arrangement. 

To consider this, a cost-benefit analysis must set out the ‘counterfactual’, i.e. what would happen in the absence of EU membership, and identify what is incremental as a result.  However, there are a number of options.  The ‘do nothing’ option means trading with the EU based on the UK membership of the World Trade Organisation (WT0).  This does not mean free-trade; it will entail custom duties for certain products such as cars.  There are also other options as represented by the cases of Norway, Switzerland and Turkey.  The bottom line is that you cannot seriously consider the costs and benefits of EU membership without taking an explicit view on an alternative from the very beginning.

If so, here are a number of questions and answers to identify what is incremental (including the benchmark of EU membership).  A "smiley" indicates that the change (or lack of it) is a positive development from a cost-benefit perspective.

A couple of points to note about the table.

Firstly, UK manufacturers exporting to the EU will need to comply with EU product regulations.  They are likely to end up manufacturing to UK and EU product regulation standards so (at best) cost savings would be limited. 

Secondly, the distinction between goods and services in the table is the reality of “free trade”, which does not usually apply to services, such as financial, business and legal services.  They represent 78% of the UK GDP. 

The table suggests that being outside the EU could be cheaper on a ‘cash’ basis.  However, none of the options would appear to replicate the benefits of a single market.  Norway replicates many of the benefits at a reduced cost.  However, note that they are bound to follow EU legislation without having a saying on it – an interesting view about sovereignty! 

Overall, I struggle to see how the UK would be able to replicate the economic benefit of the single market in products and services outside the EU. 

However, the real value of cost-benefit analysis is the impetus to focus on increasing benefits and reducing costs.  This means considering how to reform the EU and get the best from a single market of 510 millions of consumers and a GDP that is as large as the US.  Dixon suggestions include cutting red-tape, negotiating trade deals with US, Japan and China.  For me, one of the more interesting suggestions is the potential gains from banking disintermediation and providing long-term finance to industry through capital markets.  As he puts it, the crisis was a banking crisis not a financial crisis.  Something for another post …  

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