The Bank of England (BoE) recently published the results of the first concurrent stress testing of UK banks (click here for a post about the implications of this exercise). Stress testing is not only relevant to banks; EIOPA also initiated a similar process and carried out an exercise in 2014, which I will cover in a future post.
Much has been written about the results for
individual banks. I would like to share
some observations about an aspect of stress testing with wider implications:
the consideration of ‘so what’ that may take place when the stress
materialises.
In the BoE stress testing, banks had to
spell out the management actions they envisaged taking. These actions were subject to scrutiny by the
Bank of England and ‘a high threshold was set for accepting’ them.
There is little detail about the specific
management actions that were accepted.
Broadly speaking, they appear to be mainly reduction in costs and
dividend. Furthermore, the BoE clarified that they did
not accept management actions that resulted in a unilateral reduction in credit
supply in the stress scenario. This
approach meant that management actions had limited impacts, specifically no
impact for two banks and, for the other six banks, an average improvement (i.e.
an increase in common equity Tier 1 [CET1] after the stress) of 9%.
In an earlier post (here), I suggested the
consideration of ‘so what’, including the ability to carry out actions that
mitigate the impact of the stress as one of the potential benefits of stress
testing. How should we reconcile this
with the limited scope of management actions recognised in this exercise?
A useful starting point would be to make a
clear distinction between stress testing undertaken for different purposes and
audiences. This is summarised in the
table below:
‘Internal’
|
‘External’ / BoE
|
|
Purpose
|
Identifying vulnerabilities and addressing them
|
Evidencing overall resilience
|
Focus
|
Lines of business/ business units
|
Enterprise wide
|
Given the BoE’s intention to continue
stress testing and make them an integral part of the supervisory landscape, the
question would be how to integrate these two different perspectives of stress
testing.
Ideally, a bank would start an internal
review of stress vulnerabilities at the business unit level as soon as the
submission to the BoE is delivered. This
would enable the bank to identify and put in place the appropriate risk
mitigation. For example, the bank may choose
to adjust its credit risk mitigation by transferring loans or hedging credit
before the next BoE stress testing.
Given the focus on addressing vulnerabilities, which could require board
approval, it would make sense to review stress vulnerabilities of specific
business units/lines of business on a staggered basis.
Adopting this approach over time would
deliver a virtuous cycle of identification of stress vulnerabilities and enhanced
risk mitigation which would be reflected in the next stress testing for the
BoE.
In conclusion, while the BoE may have adopted ‘a high threshold’ for
accepting management actions, banks can still build in a process to identify
and implement these management actions and evidence how they address
vulnerabilities in key business units and product lines.
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